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Introduction 
This manuscript is a draft of the international I inkages section of 
a primer on linkages between macro or monetary-fiscal policy (U.S. and 
World) and U.S. agriculture to be published by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. The two remaining sections are 1) monetary and fiscal 
policy linkages including the exchange rate and 2) monetary-fiscal policy 
linkages to U.S. production agriculture and U.S. demand for agricultural 
products. This section is shared in prepublication form to allow inter-
ested readers early access to the material. 
With this brief introduction (to important topics not addressed 
here that are hopefully addressed in one of the other sections and to 
references to missing sections) this section of the primer addresses six 
important topics: 1) the basis for trade or why we export some commodi-
ties and import others, 2) policies constraining agricultural trade, 3) 
evolution of the international financial system, 4) export linkages, 5) 
import linkages, and finally 6) linkages to macro policy variables. Since 
the purpose of the primer is to teach about linkages or relationships, 
there is not a section which analyzes the policy implications deriving 
from these linkages. 
I~ERNATIONAL LINKAGES WITH U.S. AGRICULTURE 
Basis tor Trade 
\country tPnds Ln eofl<;lllllt' lhosL' )~oods nnd servin•s which yiL•Id lht• 
greatest satisfaction to its rec;id€'nts. This in turn implies that those 
goods dnd services which are produced yield the greatest return to its 
resource base, i.e., the physical, human, and natural resources present 
within the country. In a world where there is relatively free exchange 
of goods and services among countries, nearly all countries can increase 
their <;atisfaction by producing a different set of goods and services than 
they .:onsume. In this section, three concepts are discussed: l) comparative 
:1dVdlll agt•, '2.) t:'X<:ess demand/ supp I y, and '3) comp.arat i ve udvantagt• ot U.s. 
agriculture. 
Comparative Advantage 
With the opportunity to trade, a country maximizes its satisfaction 
by producing those goods and services which it can produce at relatively 
low costs, and exchanging some of those goods and services for other goods 
and services which it produces at relatively high costs. This incentive 
to rroduce those goods and services which can be produced at the relatively 
lowest costs is called the ~inciple of comparative advantage. 
This principle of comparative advantage does not imply that only the 
lowest cost countries produce a good or service. A principle of absolute 
advantage might imply that some countries produce no goods or services 
becaust~ they are not the lowest absolute cost producers of anything. The 
pt·i.1ciplt> of comparative advantage implies that each country has a unique 
bundle of goods and services which it can produce and export even if it is 
not the lowest absolute cost producer of anything. 
l 
Excess Demand/Supply 
If a country has an excess supply of a good or service at the world 
market price and exports part of its output, it probably has a comparative 
.Jcivantaw~ in the production of that good or servicl~. lf a country hJ.c; an 
;·xc!•ss d;:mand for a goo<l or servi<'l' and imports JMrt or a II of its <'Oitsump-
Lion, it probably does not have a comparative advantage for production. 
Excess demand/supply curves are derived from the country demand and 
supply curves for the good or service. In Figures 1 and 2, illustrations 
of excess wheat supply or demand are shown for a country with an excess 
supply and an excess demand, respectively. The demand curve shows the 
quantity of wheat demanded (consumed) at each price of wheat; the supply 
curve shows the quantity of wheat supplied (produced) at each price of 
wheat. The demand curve is negatively sloped; at higher prices of wheat 
Less wheat is consumed. The supply curve is positively sloped; at higher 
prices of wheat more wheat is produced. The price P0 is the price where 
quantity demanded equals quantity supplied, Q0 ; the price Pw is the wortd 
or international price. Without trade, each country consumes Q0 at price 
Po• 
\lith trade, both countries have incentives to enter the international 
'"'heat market. In Figure 1, where Pw is greater than P 0 the country enters 
the market as an exporter. At world price, Pw, quantity supplied increases 
from Q0 to Q8 while quantity demanded decreases from Q0 to Qd• The balance, 
Qs - Qd, is exported. This balance is point Qx on the excess supply curve. 
Th<> excess supply curve is equal to the quantity suppli(•d minus the quantity 
When P0 is greater than Pw, as in Figure 2, the country enters tlte 
international market as an importer. At world price, Pw, quantity demanded 
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increases from Q0 to Qd while quantity supplied decreases to Q8 • The 
h.1lance, Qd - Qs, is imported, and is point Qm on the excess demand curve. 
The excess or import demand curve is equal to the quantity demanded mirJus 
the quantity supplied at each price below P0 • 
Both countries potentially gain from trade. The country in Figure 
I is able to expand production of wheat, a commodity which it product's .1t 
relatively low cost, export wheat, and use the foreign exchange edrning.:; 
to import other goods and services. Although wheat consumption decreases 
because wheat price increases, consumers in Figure l are able to increase 
consumption of other goods where the situation is as depicted in Figure 2. 
The country in Figure 2 potentially gains through the ability to 
increase wheat consumption through imports at the world price. Wheat 
production decreases and the resources are released to produce goods <~nd 
services where the country is in the situation depicted in Figure 1, i.e., 
where its costs are less than the world price and it can sell in export 
tnar:k~ts to earn foreign exchange. 
Compdrative Advantage of U.S. Agriculture 
Based on U.S. exports and imports of agriculturdl products, agriculture 
in the U.S. probably has a comparative advantage in the production ot feed 
~rains (primarily corn), food grains (primarily wheat) and oilseeds (primarily 
soybeans). Since 1970, these three product groups have comprised 60 to 70 
percent of U.S. agricultural exports with about equal shares from each 
group. Cotton, tobacco, and animal products are other important export 
pt-oduets, but IJ.S. imports of animal products .-1.re ,tpproximately eqn<~L Ln 
exports. In addition to anim,'il produet<>, imports of agricultural products 
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an• ..:oncentrated on tr<)picnl products o;uch as coffee, cocoa, fruits, and 
vegetahlcs. 
Polic1es Constraining Agricultural Trade 
Tu achieve national objectives, countries develop and implement many 
polici.:s. Some of the-;e policies are directed at the export or import of 
pdrticular goods or services, and are naturally considered in an analysis 
,)t t r<~dl•. Nost po lieies, however, are prun~1rily directed at dumesti<: 
non-trade objectives; many of these policies also have important eftects 
on trade. For example, health and Sdfety regulations may restrict the 
import of or encourage the export of drugs, pesticides, or machinery which 
do not comply with the domestic regulations. Or, high wheat price supports 
may be used to encourage the adoption of new technology, but also encourage 
excessive imports of wheat which is likely to result in an additional trd.df• 
restriction policy to prevent excessive imports. This section consists ot 
three parts: 1) commodity policies with important linkages to trade, 2) 
trade po U cies, and '3) trade agreements. 
Commodity Policies 
There are two basic commodity policies used to support or encourdge 
farm production: commodity price supports and input price or credit sub-
sidies. A commodity price support policy in most countries establishes a 
floor or minimum guaranteed price. An input price or credit subsidy eith~r 
reduces the cost of the input or reduces the cost of credit obtained tor 
the purchase of agricultural inputs. The reasons for use of these policies 
differs, depending on whether the commodity is imported or exported. 
In an importing country either commodity price supports or input-credit 
subq idit~s or both are usually used to encourage increased output. ln the 
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Eur•)pean Economic Community (EEC) and Japan, income support and reduction of 
price variance are also objectives. While both policies are expected to 
increase output and reduce imports, only the price support policy, if the 
price support level is greater than the international trade price, is 
expected to generate the need for a more direct trade policy to control 
excessiv~ imports. 
Lncome support and reduct ion of price variance are gerwral goals ot 
price supports and input subsidies in exporting countries. Australia, 
Canada, and the u.s. are the major grain exporting countries with these 
objectives. Price supports are subject to production restrictions ur 
quotas in most years. Newly emerging exporting countries such as Brazil 
and Argentina still retain goals of encouraging production. Since price 
support levels are nearly always above world prices in exporting countries, 
pri.ce supports usually result in mort~ product to export hut r-educed dt'mand 
lor exports because of the higher !->Upport price. 
In the U.S., agricultural policy since 1961 has consisted of price 
Stipports (loan ratio plus a supplemental subsidy to reach a target price) 
avR.ilable to farmers who comply with "voluntary" diversion requirements to 
remove a minimum percent of cropland from production. In addition, the 
farm credit system has provided credit at subsidized interest rates, R 
suhsidy which has essentially become nonexistent at present. 
The E~:C and Japan, R.S major importers of wheat, corn, and other grains, 
Sllpport grain prices at levels above international trade prices. In addition, 
durum wheat producers in regions of the EEC characterized by low yields 
rl:!cei.ve a production subsidy. Japanese far-mers receive subsidies for Lhe 
diversion of rice paddy fields to wheat or harley because there is usually 
a surplus of rice. 
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T r.\de Policies 
Tariffs (import taxes), export subsidies, and quotas are the polictes 
which probably come to mind most frequently when discussing trade policy. 
llowev<·r, ust• of these trdde policy tooL:.; appears to be declining hecaus1! of 
mull i·-l.ttpr;ll Lr;tdt• IH')',ot iati.ms and, mor•· importantly, the pl'rceiv<'d rw<·d 
lor mnre !Lexibl<.? policy tools since LhP breakdown of Bretton Woods in I':J/l. 
The most important tariff poli.cy at present is probably the variable levy 
system of the EEC where the import tax is set such that the minimum commo-
dity import price plus tax (v:J.riable levy) is equal to the support or 
targtet price of the commodity. Korea and Japan use a combination tarift-
quota policy where a tariff is imposed when imports exceed a stipulated 
quo t ;l. 
Till' most promi.nP.nt. tracl<' policy ()r rt!striction at present i~; somv 
I orm nl dire<~t sliltt~ trading, i.e., whL'rP the nat ion<1l government or. some 
appoirttec! organization makes all export sales or import purchases. The 
wheat marketing boards of Australia and Canada are examples where exports 
are controlled by a single quasi-government unit. Brazil, Argentina and 
South Africa use a combination of export quotas or licenses, and taxes l)r 
subsidies to control exports. 
A recent example of state import trading is the Russian wheat deal 
of l Y72. State tradt:•rs from the USSR. simultaneously purch:lsed grai.n from 
sever.1l compani·~s ancl were ablt.• to ohlain signed contracts belore the 
market price of wheat responded to the increased demand. In addition 
to the centrally planned economies, Brazil, Korea, India, Japan and 
Hexico are other examples of countries w-here import purchases of one or 
more commodities are made exclusively by a governmentally sanctioned unit. 
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The growth of discretionary tr<iJ,, p(>Li<..:ies in tlte form of sldt•• tr<~di ng, 
t>lllD<~rgos, licensing <Ind other cidminislrativt' polh·ie-. incn•,J.ses signilic.llllly 
1 IH' di It i ('til ty of predicting how '-!X ports or imports rPspnnd lo pr i n• ('lt.t!l)',PS. 
iHth knowledge of domestic commodity supply and demand functions from which 
e'C('E'<;S demand or supply functions can be derived, the estimation of the 
impacts of tariffs, export taxes and quotas is straightforward. However, 
v€'ry little is known about what state traders or other government adminis-
trators take into account in making export or import decisions. 
Trade Agreements 
Th!::!rt! are two types of trade agreements: bilateral and multilateral. 
,'\ bi lc1ter<1l trade agreement is an agreement he tween two countries for the 
pttrch<Ise or exchange of specific commodities. 'fhe grdin agreements betwe!~n 
Lhe IJ.S. and the USSR and the U.S. and the Republic of China are hilatt!r,-ll 
1 r.1de agreements. A hi lateral <igreement i <; re L-tt i ve ly e,1sy to obtain 
lweause only two countries are iuvolvt•d. lt cdn be re:-;trietive it tlw 
negotiated agreement isolates the negotiated commodities from market fences. 
Multilateral agreements occur when three or more countries are involved. 
Because more countries are involved, multilateral agreements are much more 
ditficult to negotiate. The two major multilateral trade organizations are 
GATL' (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and UNCTAD (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development). The GATT, established in 1948, is 
.t f,)rlllll wlrPrt' contr.wting p<lrtil'H work togvlltPr for liH' litwr.~li/..ltion ul 
ltdde. Trade in agricultural products was initially excluded at the n·quest 
ol tlw IJ.S. Tht> K(;'lllledy Round (l1Jb4-67) was orw ot the ht•ttC'r known 
negotiating conferences. The Reagan Administration asked tor a llt!W round 
of GATT negotations in 1985. 
The UNC.1:AD was established in 1964 as a permanent organ of the General 
Assemhly of the United Nations. The Conference normally meets every four 
Yl'dl .;, wlli 1,. tlw Tr,t<lt> .md llevl•lopml'llt Bo.1rd lllt.>l'tS :imHr.tl Ly. The ,tims of 
IJNCfAD :ire l) the promotion ot intE:!rnational trade especially between 
dt!VPI•)ping c;ountries and bPt,.,een countries with different economic and 
sociql organizations, 2) to formulate principles and policies on trade, 
3) to review and coordincite activities of other UN institutions, and 
4) to initiate action for negotiation and adoption of multilateral agree-
ments. The GKfT and UNCTAD jointly run an International Trade Center 
founded in 1964. 
[n addition to commodj ty and trade policies, agricultural trade 
depends upon the international exchange system and the financial flows 
across countries. In the next section, we discuss how the present inter-
national fin!'l.ncial system evolved. 
Evolution of the International Financial System 
The international financial system has undergone major changes since 
1970. These changes ar~ an integral part of changes in international 
tr:1de relationships. [t is important to understand how financial linkages t•> 
macroeconomic policy have changed in the post-Bretton Woods era in order 
to understand the financial linkages to agricultural trade. In this 
section ther~ are four parts: 1) The Bretton Woods Agreements, 2) Break-
down of the Bretton Woods System, 3) A Flexible/Managed-Float Exchange 
System, and 4) Price Adjustment with I<'lexible F.:xchange Rates. 
Thf:' Bretton Woods Agreem(:'nts 
T lw Bretton Woods AgreelllJ:'nts, established in 1944, were designed to 
tighten exchange controls over private capital movements. They were deve-
9 
loped in response to volatile money flows during the pre World War II 
period. The World Bank and the International Monetdry Fund (U1F) were 
·niginated in the agreements. 
The World Bank was designed to finance economic development in two 
programs. The first program, supported by funds from capital markets of 
member countries, finances development projects at market rates of interest. 
The second, with funds contributed by donor countries, finance loans .-it con-
cessionary rates. 
The IMF was established to finance short-term adjustments to bo.l<mct' of 
paytnents problems. It originally ho.d three objectives: l) to IaonH(>r alld 
advise on changes in exchange rates and exchange prdctices, 2) to borrow 
from/lend to member countries, and 3) to use its Special Drawing Right<> 
(SDRs) to stabilize currency markets. 
Under the Bretton Woods agreements, the so-called world dollar 
standard existed whereby the U.S. government maintained convertibility of 
the dollar into gold at $35 an ounce. The currencies of all other countries 
had fi~ed dollar parities (exchange rates). The heart of this fixed exchange 
rate system was the willingness of central banks to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market in order to keep their currencies within 0.75 percent of 
their dollar parities; the U.S. Federal Reserve typically did not intervene. 
In most cases, industrial countries adjusted their internal fino.ncial 
j>olicies to preserve the exchange rate. Gold convertibility was viewej as 
essential in making the fixed exchange standard satisfactory. 
Hr..:!akdown of the Bretton Woods System 
It is not possible to attribute the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
fixed exchange rate system to any particular factor. Begining in the 1960s, 
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sPver.-~1 factors emerged which put growing pressure on the maintenance of 
f ix~·d exchange rates. Two of the early factors were increased growth of 
tlw ll.S. money supply (HI) in rcsporHw to the Gn•at Society pro~r,un!-l and 
the Vi~tnam war, and the emergence of the Eurocurrency market in the mid 
I 9bUs due to U.S. banking controls. Both factors increased the difficulty 
of maintaining gold convertibility at $35 per ounce. Between 1969 and 
1972, international reserves tripled while deposit bank foreign liabilities 
(a measure of international private bank credit outstanding) more than 
doubled. Growth of the world money supply (Ml) rose above 11 percent in 
1971 and ha'i exceed this rate in every year through 1983. In sum, from 
1960 onward there was growing pressure for a more flexible exchange system 
and reduced willingness by the U.S. to conduct the disciplined monetary 
polic-y rNJuired to maintain the fixed exchange system. The u.s. ceased 
gold convertibility and tirst devalut•d the dollar in late 1971; it then 
devalued the dollar again in early 1973 and floated it against other cur-
rencies. With continued devaluation pressure on the dollar, a new system 
was forced to emerge. 
A Flexible/Managed-Float Exchange System 
The exchange system which has emerged is a combination of floating 
exchange rates among the developed or industrial countries of Europe, 
Japan, Canada and the u.s., and fixed developing country currency to U.S. 
dollar exchange rates. Developing countries are free to revalue their 
currencies against the dollar at any time without approval of the IMF. As 
the system emerged thn>Ugh the 1970s, it could be characterized as a system 
of easy credit. Rapid world money growth continued as did expansion of 
international reserves and international credit fueled by recirculation of 
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petrodollars. Rapid world money growth has continued in the early l9HUs, 
but U.S. money growth and international reserves and credit growth have 
slowed. Several developing countries have incurred major debt repayment 
problems as money growth rates of i.ndustrial countries were reduced and the 
dnys of easy credit ended. 
Under the flexible system the dollar is no longer the only reserve 
currency; the currencies of most developed countries serve to some extent 
as reserve currencies. The multipl i.city of reserve currencies has been 
.1ccompanied by significantly increased substitutability among these 
currencies. As a result, and contrary to expectations that each country 
would be able to conduct monetary and fiscal policy independently of 
that in other countries, experience suggests that changes in monetary or 
fiscal policies in one country can generate large capital movements across 
one or more countries. For example, the recent relatively tight monet.-1ry 
policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve in combination wi.th a deficit fiscal 
policy is credited with creating relatively high real interest rates i.n the 
li.S. and a high exchange value of the dollar, which in turn are responsible 
tor net capital inflows and a large balance of trade deficit for the u.s. 
The IMF has been forced into several new roles under the flexible 
exchange system. These roles include 1) lender of last resort, 2) counselor 
co delinquent debtor countries, and 3) coordinator in the rescheduling of 
delinquent loans. 'The volatility of the international financial system has 
led several economists to recommend the establishment of exchange conlrols, 
the establishment of limits on exchange rate fluctuations or the coordination 
of money supply growth across the major industrial countries. 
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Price Adjustment with Flexible Exchange Rates 
~side from transportation costs and import or export taxes, the price 
of .mv <·ornmodity, say whPat, in ,1 country can he expressl..'d in tt•r-m.s of 
anotlwr country's price, say the u.s., as 
Pd = e Pus 
whert~ I'd is the domestic price of the given country, Pus is the U.S. price, 
and !:' is the exchange rate defined as the domestic currency units required 
to purchase one dollar. For example, it took about 250 Japanese yen or 3 
German marks to purchase one dollar in 1984. As long as this relationship 
between domestic and other country (U.S.) general price levels is maintained, 
there is said to be purchasing power parity (PPP). Under PPP, a change i.n 
any variable generates an expected immediate adjustment in the remaining 
variables to reestablish the equality. When tariffs, quotas, marketing 
boards or other trade restrictions dt:"e used, PPP is usuRlly violated. 
llnder the Bretton Woods fixeci exchange rate system, the exchange rat!:' 
was fixed or allowed to change only under highly controlled conditions. 
Under the fixed rate system, the relative prices of wheat or any other 
commodity between two countries were equal to the fixed or constant exchange 
r.'lte 
e*=constant 
Pus 
Under the flexible/managed-£ loat exehange system, e is variable bet•,.,een 
any two countries which allow their exchange rates to float. The U.S., Can.uln, 
Japan, Australia and the countries of Europe allow their exchange rates to flodt 
among each other, while many developing countries peg their exchange rates 
to the dollar. When e is variable then the relative prices of each commodity 
between any two countries must change as e changes for reasons which may 
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b<:> totally unrelated to production or consumption ot the commodity. For 
t'Xample, the trade weighted value of the dollar rose about 75 percent 
between 1980, its low, and 19S4. This means that the ratio of Pw/Pus must 
have risen from say 1 to 1.75, where Pw is world price, if U.S. wheat wds 
to maintain its competitive position in world markets. In other INOrds, the 
change in e generated a world price increase of 75 percent relative to the 
IJ.S. price (or a 45 percent decrease in the U.S. price relative to the 
world price). Shown in Figure 3 is the linkage between the exchange vdlue 
o~ the dollar and the index of prices received by U.S. farmers. Changes of 
lhis magnitud(' in exch.-~nge r<~tes stimul.-\tP reqllt>'->l<; lor Lr.-1de restricltons 
by producers in the country whose exchange rate rises, in this case in the 
United States. 
Export Linkages 
In the previous sections, the reasons for trade, trade policies, and 
the evolution of the international financial system were discussed. ln 
this section, the ways in which U.s. agriculture fits into the world food 
and tiber system is discussed. At the same time, an attempt is made to 
;;how how trade policies and the financial system affect behavior of the 
world food and fiber system. Five topics are addressed in this section: 
l) world food demand, 2) world food supply, 3) export supply, 4) import 
demand for food, and 5) the demand for U.S. agricultural exports. 
World Food Demand 
The demand for food is affected primarily by relative food prices, real 
pPr capita income and population. The economic theory of demand implies that 
Lhe quantity demanded of food increases as food prices decrease and <1S pi•r 
e.;pit.l iucome and population increase. 
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Figure 3. Exchange Rate (XR) by Prices Received by Farmers (PREC) 
Food Consumption. World food consumption grew at an estimated 2.5 perct:lnt 
per year during 1960-80. Growth was faster in developing countries at 2.8 
t0 3.0 percent per year than in the developed countries at 2.2 to 2.4 perct:lnt. 
Per capita GNP growth was similar between developing and developed countrie<.> 
while population growth was higher in the developing countries than in the 
rleveloped countries. The rate of growth of food consumption is expected to 
he less during 1980-2000 than during liJo0-80 because of slower per C<ipita 
income growth in the developing countries and of credit issues discu~Hlt:!d in 
the macroeconomic linkages section below. 
Income and Price Elasticities of Demand. While food consumption is expected to 
expand in proportion to population growth, the response to income and pr1ce 
changes is expected to be less than proportionate. The responsiveness of 
consumption to income or price is measured by an elasticity. The income 
(price) elasticity of demand is defined as the percent change in the qudntity 
ot food demanded when income (price) changes by one percent. The income 
elasticity is expected to be positive while the price elasticity is expected 
to be negative. When the elasticity has an absolute value of less than one, 
i.e., when quantity demanded changes less than proportionately to price or 
income, it is said to be inelastic. When greater than one, an elasticity is 
said to be elastic. 
The income and price elasticities of demand for food products art:! generall) 
inelastic, i.e., quantity demanded changes less than in proportion to income 
or price. There are no estimates of the "world" demand for food from which 
priC(' and income ~:>lasticities can be obtained. What is availabl~ are ~lasti-
d ty estimates for individudl countries or tor groups of countries such as 
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~:~~C, centraUy planned economies or subgroups of developing countries for 
specific food commodities or groups of commodities. 
The largest number of price elasticity of demand estimates are for wheat 
and corn. Price elasticity estimates for wheat are smaller in absolute valu • 
for <k·vl-'loped countries including the U.S., EEC, CanRda, Australia and .l,lp,lll 
than for in developing countries. For corn, price elasticity estimates 
are of larger magnitude in the developed countries, probably because of 
large use as feed for livestock which has a more elastic but still inelastic 
response. 
There are very few estimates of income elasticities of demand. In 
general, it appears that the income elasticity of demand for food grains 
(grdirtH for direct human consumption, such as wheat) is very close to zero 
in developed countries, i.e., an increase in income has no effect on consump-
tion, while it i.s less than one-half in developing countries. Income elasLi-
cities for livestock products appear to be inelastic but larger than those 
for food grains, and perhaps as large as one in some developing countries. 
In summdry, the demand function for food products is characterized by 
price and income elasticities which are less than one in magnitude. These 
estimdtes imply that a relatively small increase in world output will be 
accompanied by a relatively large decrease in world price unless income or 
populc1tion increases to offset the implied price decrease. 
World Food Supply 
The world supply of food is affected primarily by two factors: food 
prices relative to input prices and weather. Higher food prices encourage 
farmer~ to invest in production capacity and increase output. Weather 
fluctuations tend to randomly affect food production, but weather impacts 
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:1re trequently large as compared to price and income changes. 
Food Production. Food production grew at an estimated 2.5 to 2.6 percent 
per year during 1960-80, which is very simil'lr to the rate of growth in 
food consumption. The rates of growth in the developing and the developed 
countries were similar. The rate of growth of food production during the 
1970s was less than during the 1960s, with the largest decrease in rate of 
;,rowth occurring in the developed countries. Projections to the year 2000 
suggest slower food production growth during 19!:SU-20UU. 
Price Elasticities of Supply. Large impacts of weather fluctuations on 
food production make it much more difficult to estimate food supply functions 
than demand functions. As a result, estimates of price elastid ties are scarce. 
The price elasticity of supply is the percent change in quantity from a one 
percent change in price; it is expected to be positive. Some have suggested 
!llMt the U.S. price elasticity of food supply is greater than one, i.e., 
~lastic. Most evidence, however, suggests that short to medium run (one to 
five year) elasticites are less than one-half in the U.S. and in other 
countries. 
The 1972 Food Crisis. In addition to changes in the international financial 
'>ystem which occurred in the 1965-1'3 period, the tood system ex.perieneed some 
,HJditional shocks. In 1972, world grain production decreased by about 6 
percent, or 37 metric tons, from 1971. While this production shortfall in 
itself is not of crisis magnitude, it was accompanied by relatively low world 
'>foeks of gntin. The U.S. in particular, the major holder of carryover grain 
stocks, had been very successful in reducing record levels of grain stocks 
held by government in 1960 to very low levels by 1970. At the same time, 
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in 1972 the Soviet government decided to make large wheat purchases to 
maintain growing demand ft>r livestock pro<iucts. This Russian wheat deal, 
de<;crihecl earlier, amounted to $1J63 million or one third of the inf"r~·nsl' in 
the value of U.S. grain exports for fiscal 1973. 
Export supply 
The export or excess supply tunction is the difference between quantity 
produced and quantity consumed at each price level (Figure 1). A. country which 
expol·ts an agricultural commodity probably has a comparative advantage in its 
production, i.e., at the world market price more is produced than is consumt-d. 
Since II.S. agricultural exports are concentrated in wheat, coarse grains and 
oilseeds, the trade discussion which follows is focused on these commodities. 
Trade in Agricultural Commodities. The nominal value of world agricultural 
export~ increased from $33 billion in 1960 to $233 billion in 1981 before 
declining (Table 1 ). This rapid growth of exports was dominated by inflation; 
the illfl:Hion-adjusted incre.ises are I') percent in 1960-72 and 41 percent 
over 1972-l'H. Al.so shown in Table I are wheat, coarse grains, and soybl•.tnf; 
exports. Trade in each of thest:• commodities, which are the dominant componc•tlt-; 
of U.S. exports, grew more rapidly than total inflation-adjusted agriculturdt 
exports. 
Also shown in Table 1 is the U.S. share of world agricultural exports. 
From 1973 to 1981, the U.S. share of total exports was in the 17-19 percent 
range. The u.s. has dominated the soybean market until recently and showed 
an increasing share of the coarse graino:; market through 1981. The year l9Hl 
was an exceptionally high year for the U.S. market share of wheat. 
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Hajor Agricultural Exporters. In addition to the u.s., the major wheat 
~xporting countries are Canada, Australia, Argentina, and France. Since 
1960, these five countries have shipped 75 to 90 percent of wheat exports. 
fhe u.s. alone originates 30 to 40 percent of all wheat exports. 
The major exporters of coarse grains since 1 Y60 are the U.S., Canada, 
Australia, Argentina, Thailand and South Africa. These six countries 
have originated 65 to 90 percent of coarse grain exports. The u.s. share 
has been 40 to 60 percent of coarse grain exports. Brazil and the Republic 
of China have emerged as exporters of coarl>t! grains in the early 1980s. 
The u.s. is the dominant exporter of soybeans. Argentina and Brazil 
have also become significant producers of soybeans and compete with the 
U.S. in international oilseeds markets. 
l'ilblc l--Wor1d Agricultural exports, Totd1 and Sele<'ted Commodities 
Item Total Wheat Coarse Soyheans 
Grains 
Billion ----Hillion metric tons----
dollars 
1960 33 44 26 4 
1Y72 66 56 56 14 
l91:H 233 99 104 26 
Percent Change (Inflation Adjusted) 
1960-72 100(15) 27 115 2)0 
1972-81 250(41) 77 86 86 
Percent u.s. of World 
1960 l'5 41 42 LOU 
197'2 14 2Y 43 H6 
llJH I 18 4Y b8 8.) 
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Price Elasticities of Export Supply. The difficulty of estimating food 
supply functions extends to the esUmation of export supply function~;, 
since t~xport supply is dependent on domestic supply. Om> study of ttw 
aggregate (all exporting countries) export supply of wheat and coarse 
grains estimates the aggregate price elasticity of export supply for wl1eat 
at U.S to l.l and for coarse grains at 2.0 to 5.4. The domestic elasticity 
estimates discussed earlier suggest that the export price elasticity is 
nearer the lower bound of these estimates. 
Import Demand 
The import or excess demand function is the difference between 
quantity consumed and quantity produced at each price level (Figure 2). 
Major Agricultural Importers. Large importers of wheat, coarse grains and 
soyheaus are much more diversified thr1n large exporters. The importing 
dPvr·1opPd countries (DC) includE' ;>ll 0f Europe except France and .Japan. 
The import shares of these countries has declined for both wheat and coarse 
grains. For wheat, DC market shares declined from 28-40 percent during 
1960-72 to 25-30 percent during 1972-81. The coarse grains market share 
deeli.ned more strongly from 70-83 percent during 1960-72 to 55-68 percent 
during 1972-83. The soybean share was 65 to 75 percent. 
Both centrally planned (CP) and developing countries (LDC) increased 
market shares of coarse grains, CPs from 5-15 percent for 1960-72 to 15-2'> 
percent for 1972-81 and LDCs from 6-14 percent to 13-22 percent. The CP 
share of wheat is usually 2U-25 percent with no trend while the LDC share 
increased from 40-45 percent to 45-50 between 1960-72 and 1972-81. Soybean 
shares are less than lU percent for CPs and 20-25 percent for LDCs. 
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Price and Income Elasticities of Import Demand. Import or excess demdnd 
'!las defined earlier as quantity demanded less quantity supplied at each 
price. As with export supply, import demand functions are also dependent 
on domestic supply functions. However, estimation problems are not as 
difficult since the domestic demand function is relatively more import,lnt 
to import demand (in importing countries). One approach is to assume that 
'>upply is exogeneous, i.e., that quantity supplied does not respond to 
price. Under this assumption, lower bound price and income elasticities of 
the import demand function can be derived from the domestic demand function. 
Of greater concern is the impact of non-tariff trade barriers on 
t::stimates of price and income elasticities. The impacts of tariffs, export 
subsidies and quotas can be predicted because the impacts of these constraints 
on import demand can be defined and measured. However, discrl:!tionary t racle 
variables such as state trading boards, licensing or embargoes are difficult-
to-impossible to define and incorporate into estimates of import demand 
functions. What is probably being estimated in countries with non-tariff 
restrictions are the price and income elasticities of government policy 
makers or trade officials rather than of consumers. 
With these problems in mind, price and income elasticities of import 
demand are discussed. Most estimates are for wheat and coarse grains. 
Estimates of the price elasticity of the world import demand for wheat are 
between one-half and two in magnitude. Estimates for both DCs and LDCs are 
inelastic, i.e., less than one in magnitude. However, the price elasticity 
estimates for the CP countries (or state trading boards) are greater than one 
in tthsolutt! vaJue. The rel:-ttive mngnitude:; of the income elasticitil•s appear 
to be similar. The DC and LDC estimates dre less than one (inelastic) while 
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the CP c•stimdte is highly ~l<'lstic. Tlw relatively high elasticities for 
the Cl' Pconomi<.'S may reflect the use of wlte..tt as a liv~stock feed in 
these countries. 
The relative values of the price and income elasticities for coarse 
grains are similar to wheat for the three groups of countries. The magnitudc>s 
are larger, i.e., more elastic, which reflects the greater expected use of 
coarse grains for livestock feed, where price and income elasticities of 
demand for meat are expected to be larger than for direct consumption of 
grRin. 
Demand for u.s. Agricultural Exports 
In this section, the u.s. as a single exporting country to the world 
market is discussed. The trend of u.s. agricultural exports is shown in 
Figure L1. The primary issue is how import demand translates into demand 
lor IJ.S. agricultural products, namely wheat, coarse grains, and soyheans. 
Under competitive market conditions, the IJ.S. could sell all it wanted ,1t 
the world price. However, since there are few large exporting countriec; 
r.,r any commodity and the U.S. is the largest and of ten dominant exporter, 
competitive market conditions do not exist. 
Further, since the u.s. has historically maintained minimum support 
prices to producers on several commodities, including wheat and corn, it is 
asserted by some that the U.S. has been a residual supplier of commodities 
to the world market. The logic is that the maintenance of world prices at 
above equilibrium levels by the U.S. (the largest exporter) encourages 
other countries to increase production capacity and then undersell the U.S. 
in world markets. In this subsection, the translation of world import dem:md 
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Figure 4. Agricultural Exports (AEXP) by Exchange Rate (XR) 
inti) li.S. export demand is discussed under conditions of the Bretton Woodn 
and lhe flexible/managed float systems. Then empirical estimates of the 
price elasticity of demand for U.S. exports are discussed, followed by a 
discussion of the residual supplier mode t. 
Exporl Demand Under Bretton Woods. As long as the major industrial counlripo..; 
maintain ba] anced budget fiscal policies and limit monetary growth, the 
fixed exchange rate financial system can exist. As discussed earlier, as 
long dS the exchange rate between two countries remains fixed, the relative 
price of any commodity between the countries is affected only by changes 
in demand or supply conditions for the commodity. 
The strength of the fixed exchange system is its stability. Each 
country has relatively certain knowledge of its position in world markets. 
Through knowledge of its exchange rates with other countries and of its 
fisc,ll and monetary policy position, each country can establish stable 
trade linkages to other countries. It<; long run supply functions relativE' 
to those of other countries are subject only to changes in technology. 
vlith respect to food production and consumption, the major short run 
uncertainty is weather impacts on output. 
Export Demand Under Flexible Exchange Rates. With flexible exchange rates, 
the constraint which stabilizes relativt! prices between countries is 
released. Flexible exchange rates were expected to allow faster 
adjustment to external disequilibrium between countries, allowing equi-
1 ibrinm to be reestablished more quickly. The expected advantage of the 
system was that trade relationships between countries would be allowed to 
remain in equilibrium without constraining fiscal and monetary policies 
of individual countries. When a country changed its policy or exogenous 
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shocks occurred, the exchange rate would adjust and reestablish equilibrium. 
However, the flexible exchange system which has emerged since 1973 
has not fulfilled these expectations. The exchange rate has not responded 
neutrally to the fiscal and monetary policies of indiv~dual countries. 
Rather it has emerged to reflect the fiscal and monetary policy status of 
each country more than the balance of payments position. The exchange rate 
cl1<1nges for reasons unrelated to relative prices or production costs across 
countries i.e., it is more strongly affected by capital flows across countries. 
Tht• 1 inkages of the exchange rate to monetdry and fiscdl policies were (lls-
L:ussed more fully in the earlier sect1on on macro policy linkages. These 
problems have led several economists to call for the reestdhlishment of 
monetdry and fiscal coordination and disciplin~ acros~ countries, csperidlly 
by the developed or industrial countries. 
There appears to be a direct linkage between exchange rate changes and 
U.S. agricultural exports. The two periods over which the exchange value 
of the dollar fell (1971-73 and 1977-79) correspond with surges in prices 
received by U.S. farmers (Figure 3) and of exports (Figure 4). These 
periods also correspond with rapidly rising world nominal income, easy 
credit and relatively low world food stocks (reserves). Farmers in the 
U.S. responded rapidly and the U.S. was able to take> ddvantdge of a larr;e 
world demand hctore other countries inerea<>ed production Cdpacity. After 
1981, the exchange value of the dollar started rising, world nominal income 
growth declined (real per capita income growth was negative), credit was 
tightened and other countries had built new food production capacity. The 
l''>hcnc<> of this instdbi.tity Wds thdt tlw u.s. had gone from hdving a 
perhaps excessively strong competitive advantdge in the production of 
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whe.lt, corn, and soybe.ms in the 1970s to a much weaker competitive 
advdnta~e or even a competitive disddvnntdge in the 1980s for reasons 
which have no reLationship to relative production costs, i.e., to com-
parative ddvantage. 
Price Elasticity of Demand for u.s. Exports. The price elasticity of 
demand tor U.S. exports is expected to be negative and relatively large 
in magnitude. Even in a large country such as the U.S., a relatively 
large response of quantity demanded to price is expected because the im-
porting country can purchase the com[!Jodi ty from other sources if the 
exporting country raises its price. Recent evidence, however, suggests 
that the price elasticities of demand for U.S. exports of wheat,, corn, and 
soybeans are no larger than the import demand elasticities of importing 
countries which were discussed earlier. This result is suggestive of th~ 
importance of discretionary trade restrictions and bilateral trade agree-
ments in international markets for agricultural commodities. 
Exchange rate ela~ticities have also been estimated for exports 
and prices of wheat, corn, and soybeans. The exchange rate elasticity 
of exports (price) is the percent change in exports (price) from a one 
percent change in the exchange value of the dollar. Both elasticities 
are expected to be negative, i.e., an increase in the value of the dollar 
i<> expected to reduce exports and prices. Under conditions of free 
trade, the exchange rate elasticity of exports is the same as the price 
elasticity of exports, i.e., an exchange rate change is the same as a price 
change. The estimated exchange rate elasticity of exports is greater than 
one in magnitude for wheat and corn exports, but less than one for soybeans. 
The exchange rate elasticity of price is greater than one in magnitude for 
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the three commodities, i.e., a one percent increase in the value of the 
dollar leads to a greater than one percent decrease in wheat, corn, and 
svybean prices. 
The Residual Supplier Model. The residual supplier model applies to ·1 
market where there is one dominant producer and a large number of small 
producers. The market share of the small producers is not expected Lo 
respond significantly to price manipulation by the dominant firm, i.e., 
d higher than competitive equilibrium price is not expected to attrdct 
many new firms nor induce existing firms to expand output. Under these 
conditions, the dominant firm faces dn excess demand curve similar to 
Figure 2. It can determine a monopoly price and output based on that 
excess demand curve, and allow the small producers to supply alt they 
want at that price. The price set by the dominant firm must be less than 
Po in figure 2 or the small firms would supply total quantity demanded. 
ff the dominant firm miscalculates and new tirms or firm expansions an~ 
stimulated, the dominant firm loses market share. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s and again in the 19BOs, the U.S. has 
had price supports, for wheat and corn in particular, which have been greater 
tlt<1n or equal to world prices. The U.S. has also been the largest producer 
and exporter of these commodities since World War II. With the exception 
of those periods when the U.S. has subsidized exports of agricultural 
commodities, the support price has either maintained world prices at the 
U.S. support level or has at least caused them to remain above market 
cl<>dring levels bcause U.S. produced commodities were not released to 
export markets at prices below the !l.s. price support level. While no one 
dsserts that the U.S. has acted intentionally as a dominant firm to maximize 
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monopo l.y prof its, the nature of the the IJ.S. price support policy has thP 
cll.1r.u.:terisitics of rJ. r~c;1dual supplier firm which has miscalculated, i.e., 
Llw -;upport pricf> hd<> not been adJu~tt:>d sutficientl.y to st()p the loss ot 1!.'->. 
export 111crket share. 
Import Linkages 
Food products and farm inputs are imported to the U.S. as well as 
exported. In this section, imports of food products and of energy, an 
important farm input, are examined. 
Food Imports 
Agricultur~ in the u.s. can opcrdte more efficiently if some food 
products are imported .md agricultural resources are freed to produce 
outputs for which the U.S. has a comparative advantage. For example, 
tropical products such as cocoa and bananas could only be produced in the 
U.S. at high costs, perhaps confined to greenhouses. Consumer<> in the 
U.S. are better off importing cocoa and bananas from countries which 
have appropriate climates and exporting some other food product or good 
in payment for the imports. As indicated earlier, u.s. food imports are 
conc~.'llt r.-1ted in the .mimcll products and tropical products categorie~::. 
Food imports into the U.S. have grown more slowly than U.S. agri-
cultural exports, both hefore and after 1972. In part, this is because 
of very low income elasticities of dem.wd for all foods by u.s. consumers. 
The income elasticities for coffee, sugar, fruits and vegetables are each 
probabl.y less than 0.2. Several specific fruits and vegetables appear to 
have income elasticities in excess of one, e.g., oranges, tomatoes, and 
beans, but in aggregate the income ela~ticity of demand is very low. ~he 
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price elasticities of demand for these foods are also very low at zero to 
-l!.l. Similarly to the income elasticities, the price elasticities of 
S!'veral specific fruits and vegetables exceed one in magnitude becausP 
of high substitution among products, but the price elasticities of the 
agf,regated product groups (fruits, vegetables) are very small. The 
price and income elasticities of demand for animal products are larger 
in magnitude, ranging from .3 to .5 in absolute value. 
This relatively slow and stable growth in demand for food products 
imported into the u.s. is consistent with the relatively stable growth of 
the demand for food in the U.S. discussed earlier. Compared to the rest of 
the world, u.s. consumers do not make large changes in food consumption 
be>havior even when faced with rather large changes in food prices and 
income. 
Energy Imports 
F'arm inputs are not very dependent on international markets with the 
exception of energy. The U.S. has historically imported and continues to 
import a significant proportion of energy consumption needs. Energy prices 
rose significantly in 1974-75 and again in 1979-80 with rationing in 1973 
dnd 1978. These were years when the exchange value of the dollar was low. 
Tn contrast, u.s. energy prices have declined since 1981 as the exchange 
rate has risen. Since crude oil prices are quoted in dollars, a change in 
the exchange value of the dollar changes oil prices in all countries with 
floating exchange rates. During the 1970s when the value of the dollar 
was low, energy prices in the U.S. were high relative to otht!r countri~s. 
Since 1981, energy prices in the U.S. have fallen relative to prices in 
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other ·~ountries. Ont:! expected cost of a lower exchange value of the 
dolLtr is higho:•r E'nergy prices. 
Linkages to Macro Policy Variables 
In this final section on international trade linkages, the linkages 
between agricultural trade and the macro economy are discussed. Governments 
can finance expenditures in three ways: taxation, "printing" money, and 
selling bonds (running a deficit). In the U.S., only the Federal government 
is authorized to print money. Nearly all government units (state, county, 
municipal, etc.) are authorized to levy taxes and sell bonds. When tax 
revenues are sufficient to cover expenditures, the budget is balanced. 
The focus in this section is on situations where the Federal budget is in 
deficit, i.e., tax revenues are less than expenditures, and resort to 
money or bond finance is made. 
Tht~ exchange rate is considered as one of the monetary variables, 
and thus far is the only macro variable linkage which has been discussed. 
llowever, in the international financial system which has emerged since 
1972, the exchange rate is not a policy or control variable, i.e., it 
cannot be changed administratively. The exchange rate can only be changed 
through the manipulation of other variables which can be controlled. 
Linkages of the exchange rate and agricultural exports and prices to two 
monetary variables (money supply, interest rates) and two fiscal variables 
(U.S. Federal budget deficit, world credit outstanding) are explored in 
this section. 
Eftects of a Change in Money 
There are two types of monetary policies which need to be discussed: 
l) a one-timt! change in money supply and 2) a change in the rate of growth 
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i 11 the money supply. The ways in which the money supply can be changed 
~ere discussed earlier. A one-time increase in the supply of U.S dolldrs 
means that people who hold dollars in total have more dollars after than 
hefore the increase. If people were satisfied with the quantity of 
dollars they held before the change, i.e., were in equilibrium, then 
after the increase they have more dollars than they want. This will 
Lead holders of dollars to try to exchange some of their dollars for 
other things. What other things? 
As indicated earlier, money has two uses to people: 1) it is 
a store of value or asset and 2) it facilitates exchange of goods and 
services. Research shows that when people have more or fewer units of 
money than they desire, they will first attempt to trade for other stores 
of vdlue before making adjustments in trade for goods and services. 
Alternative assets to the u.s. dollar include other currencies (pounds, 
m.~rks, yen, etc.), commodities (gold, silver, oi 1, wheat, corn) or bonJs 
(private and government securities). 
With too many dollars, dollar holders begin to exchange dollars for 
marks, yen, gold, wheat, treasury bills, etc. That is, they begin to bid 
np the dollar prices of other stores of value. This has the initial 
effect of raising the exchange value of other currencies with the dollar 
(reducing the exchange value of the dollar), raising commodity prices, 
,lfld raising bond prices. Since most activity is initially concentrated 
t>n assets, the prices of stores of value are likely to initially increase 
lli<H(• tlwn proportionally to the change in mont!y supply; this is c:dlpd 
tlVcrshooting. As adjustments are extended to goods and services (consumer 
~oods), all prices are expected to increase in proportion to the one-time 
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increase in money supply. This proportionality is called the neutrality 
Of 111CHH.'Yo 
Tht> initial eftcct of the increase in the money ::>upply on tlw intert:st 
rate is to reduce it. With excess currency, holders of dollars are willing 
to accept a lower rate of return on other stores of value. This occurs 
most obviously through the bidding up of bond or fixed value security 
prices, which lowers the rate of return on bonds. Initially, the interest 
ratl! fall will overshoot its new equilibrium level as most activity is 
focused on assets. As the adjustment in consumer goods markets occurs, 
the interest rate will increase from its low. At the new equilibrium the 
dollar prices of assets and consumer goods will be higher and the U.S. 
interest rate lower because there arc more U.S. dollars relative to other 
assets and consumer goods after the one-time increase in money supply. 
[n most cdses, a country does nor make one-time changes in the money 
snpply, but rather ,1 dl'd<>ion to ch,!Jlg<' the rate of growth of the money 
supply over time. For example, i.n 1979 the U.S. l<'ederaJ Reserve made a 
policy change which reduced the rate of growth of U.S. dollars; the new 
policy changed the target variable from interest rate to money growth 
directly. The case is considered where the u.s. increases the rate of 
growth of money by one percentage point, say from 3 to 4 percent per year. 
Since this change can in part be considered as a series of one-time changes, 
the rliscussion of the one-time increase in money growth applies to this 
case. 
fn the case of a change in the rate of growth of the money supply, 
however, there are further effect~. In the case of the one-time change, 
people expect no further increases in the quantity of dollars. When the 
money supply is growing continuously from year to year and a decision is 
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.ndde to increase the rate of growth, holders of dollars are likely to 
~~J(pect that policy change to persist indefinitely. Here, the case of 
where people fully expect the policy change to be permanent is discussed, 
i.e., their beliefs are changed from expecting the U.S. money supply t•> 
grow at 3 percent per year to 4 percent per year. The money supply of 
other countries is also growing at 3 percent per year and is not expected 
to change. 
Before the policy change there are already two important differences 
between this case and the previous ease where no growth in money was 
occurring. First, since the money supply is increasing relative to com-
modities, bonds and consumer goods, the prices of these assets and goods 
,lrt' increasing at approximately 3 percent per year, abstracting from 
income and production growth effects. This 3 percent per year is ca lLPd 
the inflation rate. Second, there is now a divergence between real and 
nominal interest rates, 
rnominal = rreal + rinflation 
w'tere the nominal interest rate, i.e., that rate earned on bonds (treasury 
bills, etc.) is composed of the real rate (the inflation adjusted return) 
,Jild the inflation rate. For example, a ') percent bond with a llJU year 
maturity which sells at par ($1,000) with a zero rate of intlation would 
h.tvC' .1n expected price of about $62'i with a 
to yield an H percent nominal interest rate. 
percl•nt rate of i nt lati on 
With the increase to 4 percent in the growth rate of U.S. dollar~, 
holders of dollars desire to shift from dollars to other things. Initial 
shifts are expected to be concentrated on other assets leading to an 
increased relative rate of growth in asset prices (other currencies, 
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commodities and bonds). This increase will lower the real interest rate 
(.md probahly the nominal rate) in thP early phases of adjustment. As 
the r.lle ot pric~:> growtl1 on con~:-;umer ~~ootls increases from J to 4 percenl, 
the r~te of inflation increases to 4 percent, which raises the nominal 
interest rate (equal to the real rate plus the inflation rate) to a level 
higher than before the policy change. 
In both cases, an increase in U.S. money relative to other currencies 
is expected to reduce the exchange value of the dollar and reduce the 
real interest rate, while the nominal interest rate increases if the 
incn'ase in money supply is continuing over time. The reduced exchange 
value of the dollar improves the export advantage of U.S. products while 
the lower real interest rate reduces production costs. In the short run, 
there is excessive price incentive on agricultural commodities because of 
overshooting. In the cases of a decrease in money supply or a decrease in 
the rate of growth of the money supply, e.g., from 4 to 3 percent; all 
effects will be in the reverse direction to those discussed here. 
Effects of Bond Financing 
The financing of fiscal deficits through increased money supply was 
discussed in the previous section. In this section, the financing of the 
u.s. fiscal deficit through the sale of government securities (treasury 
bills, savings bonds, etc.) is discussed. It is assumed that money acquired 
from the sale of government securities is used to cover government expend-
Hure.:;, and that there is no effect on the supply of money. 
Tht' issuing of government securities represents an increase in the 
supply or number of interest bearing bonds in existence. If the govern-
ment is to sell these bonds, it must do so at an interest rate which 
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attrdcts dollars from other uses. As with changes in money supply, the 
early responses are likely to be concentrated in asset markets. Since 
thel:"e are a fixed number of dollar<; with which to finance assets and 
('onsumer goods, the issuance of government securities is expected to 
fit:"st increase the real interest rate and the exchange value of the 
dollar. The increase in the real interest rate generates an expected 
fall in other asset prices (non-dollar currencies, commodities, and 
bonds). The exchange value of the do Uar is expected to increase. 
1\.s the adjustments are completed in the consumer goods markets, some 
lowering of prices of consumer goods is expected. 
These effects of bond financing and no money growth are the opposite 
of money financing, leading to the opposite trade effects, i.e., lower 
exports, lower commodity prices and higher exchange values of the do liar 
with other currencies. If the budget deficit is not large, a government 
cdn finance some of its expenditures with bonds for long periods of time 
without major impacts on interest rates or the exchange rate. One measurP 
of the debt burden is the ratio of debt to GNP. In the U.S. this ratio 
fell between 1960 and 1980, although there was only one year in which there 
was a Federal government surplus. Since 1980, this ratio has risen rapidly 
indicating that the U.S. Federal debt is a growing burden on the U.S. 
economy. One recent indication of burden is that interest on the Federal 
debt is becoming an ever larger part of the u.s. fiscal budget. 
Joint Effects of Money and Bond Financing 
The rate of growth of the U.S. morwy supply as measured by Ml fi r-;t 
went to 5 percent in 1964 during the Korean War, then to 8 percent in 1~67, 
to 9 percent in 1972 and held at 8 percent during 1977-79 (Figure 7). 
3b 
Throu;~hout tlli<> period of relatively edsy money, the exchange value of th(• 
dollar was on a downward trend, i..e., the dollc~r value of other currencie•; 
w.u; increasing. Commodity prices, tor .tgricultur.ll products dnci lor oil iu 
particular, showed strong upward trends. Nominal interest rates were high 
because of relatively high rates of inflation. At many points in time 
until 1980, however, real interest rates were negative, i.e., the rate of 
inflation exceeded the nominal interest rate. Throughout this period, real 
interest rates were low. Low to neRtiv~ real interest rates occurred 
because in several yedrs actual inflation rates exceeded those anticipated 
by dollar holders. 
In 1979, the Federal Reserve changed its target from the interest rate 
to money growth directly, which resulted in reduced rates of money growth. 
Shortly thereafter, the Reagan administration began running large budget 
deficits. After declining from 60 percent in 1960, the ratio of debt to 
gross ndtional product increased from 34 percent in 1981 to 42 percent in 
1983 (F'i.gure 5). The exchange value of the dollar began increasing after 
1980, while commodity prices stated in dollars began to fall. 
Effects of International Debt 
A final topic examined in this section is the effect of international 
debt. The level of borrowed funds held throughout the world began increas-
ing very rapidly about 1968, and then slowed dramatically about 1982. These 
changes lag changes in U.S. monetary policy by about 3 years. First, the 
Great Society and Viet Nam War monetary expansion of 1964 and the following 
easy money policy was dccompanied by the recirculation of the so-called 
petrodollars after 1973. However, faster monetary expansion had been 
underway for about 8 years before the OPEC oil crisis. Then the Federal 
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Figure 5. Ratio of Debt to GDP (DETGDP) by Change in Money Supply (DUSMl) 
Reserve target change in 1979 preceded the slowdown in credit expansion 
.lltt.•r 19H2 by three yt.•nrc;. The c;low<iown oi world debt growth al"!o cnrtl'">porrd•. 
to the lncnMc;cd rate of debt Hccumulation by the U.S. 
The rapid expansion of world debt probably contributed strongly to the 
high growth in nominal world gross domestic product after 1972. However, 
it may alc;o have contributed to lower real gross domestic product growth 
after 1972 as contrasted to before 1972. 
Over 60 percent of international debt is held by important export 
markets for u.s. agricultural products. These debtor countries need to be 
able to export their products in order to gen~rate the international reserv~.., 
n(•cded to pay off loan commitment<,. Thec;e are loan commitments which were 
made during the 1970.,; under an C'asy or cheap money policy when the exchangf' 
value of the dollar was low. Now these countries are faced with repaying 
these loans in a tight money framework where the exchange value of the 
dollar and real interest rc1tes are near record highs. 
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